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  Abstract  
We use panel data from El Salvador to investigate migration and the intra-household allocation 
of labor as a strategy for coping with uninsured risk. Consistent with a model of a farm 
household with a binding subsistence constraint, we show that adverse agricultural productivity 
shocks increased both male migration to the US and the supply of male agricultural labor within 
the household in El Salvador. In contrast, after damage sustained from the 2001 earthquakes, 
female migration from El Salvador declined. This is consistent with the earthquakes increasing 
the demand for home production. Overall, household responses to uninsured risk appear to be 
consistent with a simple framework in which household members are allocated to sectors 
according to their comparative advantage. Finally, we show no evidence that the labor market in 
El Salvador is capable of helping rural Salvadoran households to buffer the effects of adverse 
shocks. 
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1 Introduction
Households in less-developed countries (LDCs) often times live very close to the
subsistence level and, at the same time, face a large degree of uninsured risk. In
such an environment, an adverse shock such as a loss of livestock or harvest can be
devastating. Because of the increased gravity of such events, households often are
forced to rely on a menu of risk coping strategies to buﬀer the event’s impact. One
possible strategy that has been discussed at length by Barzel and MacDonald (1973)
and Scott (1976) is to increase labor supplied to an activity despite lower remuner-
ation. While this is not consistent with a model of neoclassical labor supply with a
dominant substitution eﬀect, increased labor supply may be one of the more eﬃcient
1This quote from Land and Labor in China opens James C Scott’s 1976 book The Moral Economy
of the Peasant in which he discusses how subsistence concerns can lead to seemingly anomalous
outcomes in agrarian societies.
3means of keeping the household above the subsistence threshold. Alternatively, the
household may reallocate its labor towards better remunerated activities such as
working outside of the household. One possible way of doing this is to migrate to
areas with better opportunities and then remit back to the household. In this pa-
per, we consider how two risk coping strategies, migration and intra-household labor
supply, are used to buﬀer the eﬀects of uninsured risk among poorer households in
rural El Salvador.
It has been long been known that migration plays a crucial role for households in
less-developed countries (LDCs). Most obviously, migrant remittances are a crucial
source of income. The United Nations Development Program estimated that in the
year 2000, remittances contributed 1.75 billion to the GNP of El Salvador (PNUD
2001). In addition, migration is often used as a means of coping with risk. Indeed,
there is a nascent, but growing, body of literature in development economics that
has shown the importance of migration as both an ex post risk management strat-
egy (Halliday 2006; Yang and Choi 2007) and an ex ante strategy (Paulson 2000;
Rosenzweig and Stark 1989).
However, while the literature on “non-market mechanisms” for coping with unin-
sured risk in LDCs has paid a substantial amount of attention to migration, the use
4of the intra-household allocation of labor has largely been ignored.2 In this paper, we
add to this literature by investigating not only how the intra-household allocation of
labor can be used as a risk coping strategy, but also how intra-household allocations
due to, for example, productivity diﬀerences can condition the household’s migra-
tion and labor supply responses to uninsured risk. For example, in a simple model
of a farm household, the response of the labor supply of men and women within a
household to an exogenous productivity shock will depend on which members are
at interior and at corner solutions (which may be consequences of productivity dif-
ferences among household members). Theoretically, genders who are more likely to
be at corner solutions will be less aﬀected than those who are more likely to be at
interior solutions. In our empirical analysis, we provide evidence of this.
In addition, we show how much of households’ responses to risk in our data are
very much consistent with the models discussed in Barzel and MacDonald (1973)
and Scott (1976) in which the household is on the verge of falling below the subsis-
tence line. Our data paint a picture in which the household uses a variety of risk
2This paper contributes to the more general literature on the use of “non-market mechanisms”
for coping with uninsured risk in LDCs. Examples of these that have been investigated include
transferring funds within villages or families (Townsend 1994; Udry 1994a; Yang and Choi 2007),
depleting assets (Paxson 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Udry 1994b), increasing the labor
supply (Kochar 1999), adding household members (Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas 2003), and
migrating (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989; Paulson 2000; Halliday 2006). Our contribution is to further
investigate both migration and intra-household labor supply as ex post strategies for coping with
risk.
5coping methods to deal with adverse events including migration and increased labor
supply. More importantly, however, we show that often the household chooses to
increase their labor supply in sectors that have been hard hit by productivity shocks.
Increased labor supply in the presence of low marginal returns appears to be one way
in which the household keeps their head above water.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
some theoretical considerations. In the two subsequent sections, we discuss our data
and empirical ﬁndings. Finally, we conclude.
2T h e o r y
We construct a model of migration and intra-household labor supply as a means
of ex post risk management in the presence of transactions costs and subsistence
constraints. The model is very much inspired by Paxson (1990) who considers
portfolio choice in the presence of liquidity constraints and Barzel and McDonald
(1973) who consider labor supply in the presence of subsistence constraints.
2.1 Model Primitives
6T h e r ea r et w ot i m ep e r i o d s : ∈ {12}. In each period, the household is endowed
with a measure of labor of size one. In periods one and two, labor can be allocated
to the South ( for  ∈ {12})o rt h eN o r t h(  for  ∈ {12}). We assume that
0 =0 . The marginal returns to labor in the North are given by . In the South,
l a b o ri so nt h ef a r ma n dt h er e t u r n st ol a b o ra r ed e t e r m i n e db ya ni n c r e a s i n ga n d
concave production function which we denote with  () for  ∈ {12} where  is
a stochastic productivity shock. We make the normalization that  (0) = 0.T h e r e
are costs to Northward migration given by  . We assume that Southward
migration is not possible.3 In periods one and two, the household consumes a
consumption good ( for  ∈ {12}) and leisure ( for  ∈ {12}). Utility from
consumption and leisure is additively separable and is determined by two increasing
and concave utility functions denoted by  () for consumption and  () for leisure.
The household faces a subsistence constraint and so, we require that  ≥  for
 ∈ {12}. In addition, we assume that there is no savings. However, migration
will behave like a storage technology in the sense that it enables the household to
transfer utility across periods. Finally, there is no discounting.
This is a model of ex post risk management in which the household ﬁrst observes
 and then makes their labor allocation and consumption choices for that period.4
3We make this assumption to simplify some of the comparative statics calculations that come
later.
4In contrast, if we were concerned with risk management ex ante, we would need to be more
7Consequently, in the morning of period , the household observes  and then, in the
afternoon, chooses their portfolio {  }. After this, the household consumes
for that period. Finally, note that, in the ﬁrst period, second period returns are
unknown.5
2.2 Model Solution
As in Paxson (1990), we solve the model by backwards recursion. In the morning of
the second period, the agent observes 2 and inherits 1 f r o mt h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d .
Based on this information, they make their portfolio choice. Accordingly, their
period two indirect utility function is given by
 (2 1)= m a x
{222}
 (2)+ (2)
explicit about uncertainty and expectations. For example, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) argue that
marriage is used in India to diversify income streams, which in turn raises the household’s ex ante
expected utility (i.e., before any shocks have been realized). In this work we only consider decisions
that have been made after the realization of the ﬁrst period shock.
5Because of this, the general solution of the model actually does capture elements of both ex
post and ex ante risk management. However, to facilitate the exposition, we will only consider a
speciﬁcc a s ei nw h i c ht h e r ea r en oex ante risk management considerations.
8subject to
2 + 2 + 2 =1
2 = 2 (2)+1 +(  − )∆2
2 ≥ 
∆2 ≥ 0
The ﬁrst constraint is the time constraint. The second is the budget constraint.
The third is the subsistence constraint. The fourth says that we do not consider the
possibility of Southward migration.
We make the simplifying assumption that  is suﬃciently large so that 1will
be large enough that the household will choose 2 =0and 2 = 1.6 In other
words, Northern wages are high enough that the household can completely ﬁnance
its second period consumption out of its ﬁrst period migrant stock. Also, note that
if Northern wages are suﬃciently large, then the subsistence constraint will not bind
in the second period. The second period indirect utility function then simpliﬁes to
 (2 1)= (1)+ (1 − 1)
6We make this assumption to simplifying the following exposition. In addition, because we
assume that  (0) = 0, this eliminates the expectation from the maximand in the ﬁrst period’s
maximization program and, thus, any ex ante risk management considerations from the problem.
9We now move backwards to period one. In its dusk, the agent observe 1 and
then makes their portfolio choice. The indirect utility function at this time is
 (1)= m a x
{111}
 (1)+ (1)+ (1)+ (1 − 1)
subject to
1 + 1 + 1 =1
1 = 1 (1)+(  − )1
1 ≥ 
1 ≥ 0
For the remainder of this section, we suppose that the ﬁrst period subsistence con-
straint binds as this provides us with the most interesting behavior. If we let  ≥ 0
denote the multiplier on the subsistence constraint for the ﬁrst period, we can char-


















 = 1 (1)+(  − )1 (2)
Inspection of condition (1) reveals that production and consumption decisions are
closely linked. Hence, separation does not obtain in this economy. The reason is
the irreversibility of the migration investment which creates frictions in the outside
labor market.7 For an excellent discussion of the theory and empirics of separation
in farm households, we refer the reader to Benjamin (1992)
2.3 Comparative Statics
We now consider comparative statics in the model with respect to changes in ﬁrst
period returns: 1. F i r s t ,w en o t et h a t 
1  0. T h er e a s o nf o rt h i si st h a tb e t t e r
realizations of 1 make it less likely that the subsistence constraint will bind in the
ﬁrst period and, hence, will drive  towards zero. Next, we diﬀerentiate equations
(1) and (2) with respect to 1 and solve for 1
1 and 1
1.F o r ﬁrst period farm





1 [Λ1 + Γ1]
7You can have separation in a model with a binding subsistence contraint and no migration
costs. In such a model, the solution in a given period will be 0 ()= and  =  ()+.
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[−]  0 and 2 ≡
10(1)
[−]  0. Our assumptions imply that ∆1  0,
Λ1  0,a n dΓ1  0. One can interpret Λ1 as a standard substitution eﬀect; when
1 increases leisure becomes more expensive and so the household works more on
t h ef a r m . T h et e r mΓ1captures subsistence considerations; here a decrease in 1
w i l lp u s ht h eh o u s e h o l db e l o wt h es u b s i s t e n c el i n ea n df o r c ei tt ow o r km o r eo nt h e i r
farm. If Λ1 + Γ1  0, then we will have that
1
1  0, so that the household will
work less on their farm despite lower remuneration.
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10(1)  0 and 2 ≡
[−]
10(1)  0. Our assumptions imply that
∆2  0, Λ2  0,a n dΓ2  0.T h e t e r m , Λ2, contains both substitution and
subsistence eﬀects. First, as the returns to farm labor increase, the household will
substitute away from migrants in its portfolio. However, it also contains subsistence
eﬀects as well in the sense that one way to mitigate a fall in 1 is also to work
more in the North. This is enabled by our assumption that which implies
that migration yields immediate beneﬁts.8 If Λ2 + Γ2  0, then we will have that
1
1  0, so that the household will rely on migration less when returns to farm labor
are higher.
The key insight of this model is that in the presence of subsistence constraints
we can observe some behaviors that seem paradoxical. In the model, it is possible
8This is not an unreasonable assumption. Data from the Mexican Migration Project reveal that
the price of a coyote (since 1990) was about $1300 (in 1999 dollars) and data from the US census
reveal that the average hourly wage for a Salvadoran male in the US is $5.44. Accordingly, the
yearly income for somebody working 40 hours per weeek for 52 weeks out of the year is about
$11315.2.
13to observe both 1
1  0 and 1
1  0.T h e ﬁrst comparative static is intuitive since
one would expect that households will migrate in response to lower returns to labor
at home. This is consistent with Halliday (2006) and Munshi (2000), for example.
H o w e v e r ,a tt h es a m et i m et h a tw eo b s e r v et h i s ,i ti sa l s op o s s i b l et oo b s e r v et h a t
the household is working more on the farm despite a low marginal product of labor.
This is partly enabled because migration also fulﬁlls a subsistence role in the model
as discussed above. To facilitate higher labor supply on the farm and in the North,
the household takes a hit in terms of leisure consumption.
2.4 Home Production and Comparative Advantage
We conclude the theory section with a discussion of the implications of heterogeneous
types of labor, home production and comparative advantage for the household’s risk
coping strategy. Suppose that each sector  and  can be sub-divided into












. Labor productivity is hetero-










on the farm in the South. Note that we now decompose
productivity in the South into two parts. The ﬁrst is  and models stochastic pro-
ductivity shocks that are common across genders. The second is 

 for  ∈ {}
and models non-stochastic gender-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in productivity. In addition,
14suppose that there is a home produced commodity denoted by  that yields utility
 (). This commodity is produced by male and female labor allocated to this













for  ∈ {}. Productivity at home is denoted by 

 for  ∈ {}
and its decomposition is analogous to that for farm production. We make standard
assumptions on  () and ()9
Due to productivity diﬀerences between males and females, the household may be







 , then we would expect to see that the household allocates no
males to home production and no females to the farm. Scenarios such as this have
interesting implications for how the household responds to changes in  and .
Because interior solutions will be characterized by equalities and corner solutions by
inequalities, small changes in either  or  will tend to aﬀect the gender-sectors
t h a ta r ea ta ni n t e r i o ra l l o c a t i o nm o r et h a nt h o s et h a ta r ea tc o r n e r s . T h i si sa
hypothesis that we will test.
9We did not make these generalizations to the model earlier because this would have substantially
complicated the comparative statics calculations without adding any additional insights.
153D a t a
3.1 BASIS
Our primary data source is the BASIS Panel from El Salvador which was ﬁelded
by the Ohio State University and the Fundación Salvadoreño para el Desarollo
Económico y Social (FUSADES).10 We employ three waves of the panel that have
recall periods of 1997, 1999, and 2001. The data contain identiﬁers that enable us
to track households across time. Because some key variables were only available for
1999 and 2001, our regressions only use these years. However, the 1997 data was
still used in the analysis to construct lags of some of many variables. Finally, for the
duration of this paper, we will use the recall periods of 1997, 1999, and 2001 to refer
to the panel year, but it is crucial for a proper understanding of our econometrics to
bear in mind that these three surveys were ﬁelded in 1998, 2000, and 2002. This is
a point that we will discuss further towards the end of this sub-section.
3.1.1 Migrants
The BASIS data contain information on the number of migrants within the house-
hold. We deﬁne a migrant to be any household member who at the time that the
10For a more thorough discussion of these data including an analysis of panel attrition, we refer
the reader to Halliday (2006).
16survey was administered was residing in the United States or Canada.11 The survey
does not distinguish if a speciﬁcm i g r a n tw a sr e s i d i n gi nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e so rC a n a d a ,
but we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of migrants are
residing in the United States. Because of this, for the remainder of the paper we
refer to all migrants as residing in the United States. Descriptive statistics on this
variable are reported in Table 1.
3.1.2 Labor Supply Within the Household
We also employ data on intra-household labor supply. These data come from a
component of the BASIS survey that listed numerous household activities and then
asked, “Cuánto tiempo trabajó en esa actividad?” or “How much time did he (she)
work in that activity?” We employ data for three activities. The ﬁrst is what
we call “ﬁeld labor.” In the survey, this is deﬁned as “Trabajo agrícola para venta
o autoconsumo” or “Agricultural work for sale or self-consumption.” We call the
second “livestock labor,” which the survey deﬁn e sa s“ C u i d a d od ea n i m a l e sp a r a
venta o autoconsumo” or “Care of animals for sale or self-consumption.”12 Finally,
11A household member is deﬁned as someone who is tied to the family by blood or marriage.
12It is important to note that the BASIS survey does not explicitly say that what we deﬁne as
"ﬁeld labor" constitutes work such as planting, tending to, and/or harvesting crops. However, the
survey does list caring for livestock as an activity separate from what they call agricultural activity.
Accordingly, we infer that agricultural labor as deﬁned by the survey does not include hours spent
tending to livestock and thus includes primarily activities that involve crops.
17we call the third “domestic labor,” which the survey deﬁn e sa s“ L a b o r e sd o m é s t i c a s
(preparación de alimentos, limpieza, cuido de niños y enfermos)” which in English
is “Domestic labor (preparation of food, cleaning, care of children and the sick).”
This survey instrument allowed us to measure hours allocated to these activities at
the individual level. We then summed these individual level variables by household
to obtain household level variables for hours worked by all female and male family
members in each of these intra-household sectors. Descriptive statistics for these
variables are reported in Table 1.
3.1.3 Labor Supply Outside the Household
We also employ information on labor supply outside of the household. This infor-
mation comes from a diﬀerent part of the BASIS survey than the information on
labor supply within the household and is not as detailed. This survey instrument
works as follows. First, the enumerator asked if a household member worked outside
of the household during the survey year. Next, the enumerator asked if the individ-
ual worked in the following activities: agriculture, industry, commerce, or service.
The industrial category included working in textiles. Given the importance of this
industry for El Salvador during this time period, we excluded it from the industry
category and used it as an additional category, thus, yielding a total of ﬁve sectors.
18Respondents were allowed to list more than one sector. Unfortunately, we do not
know the number of hours that the respondent allocated to each sector; we only
know whether or not they worked in that sector during the survey year. As with
the data on intra-household labor supply, we summed these individual level variables
by household to obtain household level variables for the total number of female and
male household members that worked in each of these sectors during the survey year.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 2.
3.1.4 Stochastic Shocks
Our stochastic shocks come from two sources: poor agricultural conditions in 1999
and 2001 and the earthquakes of 2001. These data were not available in the 1997
data. The agricultural shocks are dummy variables indicating income loss from either
harvest or livestock loss.13 In the 1999 and 2001 panels, 25.99% of all households
reported experiencing at least one agricultural shock. The prevalence of these shocks
was slightly higher in the 2001 data, presumably due to a drought that occurred in
13Due to changes in survey design in the years 1999 and 2001, the construction of the harvest
and livestock loss dummies warrants some discussion. In 1999, the household was deﬁned to have
experienced a harvest loss if it reported losing all or part of its harvest and that this event caused
resulted in a lower household income. In 2001, the household was deﬁned to have experienced a
harvest loss if it reported that the value of its harvest was less than normal as a consequence of a
drought that occurred in 2001. Unfortunately, because the 1999 survey did not solicit the actual
cause of the harvest loss, it is not possible to have comparable measures of harvest losses in 1999
and 2001.
19that year. Our earthquake shock is an index corresponding to the (log of) monetary
value of damage sustained from two earthquakes that occurred on January 13 and
February 13, 2001 which is the beginning of the 2001 recall period. The earthquakes
registered 7.6 and 6.6 on the Richter Scale, respectively, and killed a total of 1159
people. It is estimated that the disasters had left over 1 million people without
adequate shelter by February 2001 (Nicolás and Olson 2001). Descriptive statistics
for these variables are reported in Table 1.
As in Udry (1994a and 1994b), all of the shocks we consider are based on self-
reports. Recently some researchers have shied away from using self-reported shocks
and instead have relied on variables that are supposedly more exogenous, like rainfall.
However, rainfall data do have many disadvantages. For example, in a country as
s m a l la sE lS a l v a d o r ,t h e r em a yn o tb es u ﬃcient regional variation. More important,
because rainfall data are collected at the regional level by a department or a mu-
nicipio, this precludes the use of many location dummies and raises concerns about
omitted variables. In contrast, the shocks we use vary within geographic units.14 Fi-
nally, we provide evidence in this paper and in Halliday (2006) that mitigates many
of the endogeneity concerns that have been raised about self-reported shocks.15
14For example, Halliday (2006) provides nonparametric density estimates of earthquake damage
within departments and shows that there is considerable intra-regional variation.
15F o re x a m p l e ,i nt h i sp a p e r ,w ec o n d u c tf a l s i ﬁcation tests in which we take the shock from a
given year and merge it into the dataset by household for the other year. So, if 01 and 99 are
203.1.5 Demographic Variables
Table 3 provides information on the demographic composition of households in the
BASIS data. This demographic information excludes all migrants. The categories
in this table were used to construct demographic controls in our regressions.
3.1.6 Timing of Events in the Survey
At this point, we discuss the timing of events in our survey as it pertains to the
econometric results that we present in the remainder of the paper. The dependent
variables that we employ are changes across successive surveys (i.e. the recall periods
are either 1997 and 1999 or 1999 or 2001) in the stock of either: the number of
migrants in the household, the number of hours allocated to various sectors within the
household, or the number of household members allocated to various sectors outside
the household. The number of migrants is measured at the point-in-time in which the
survey was administered (which was 1998, 2000, and 2002), but the variables on labor
supply both within and outside the household measure their quantities during the
survey’s recall period which is one year (either 1997, 1999, or 2001). The variables on
agricultural shocks measure whether or not these events took place at a point during
dependent variables for 2001 and 1999 and 01 and 99 are the shocks deﬁned analogously, we
regressed 01 on 99 and 99 on 01 to test for false treatments. In addition, in Halliday (2006), we
investigated if non-random panel attrition biased our results (in Table 6), tested if the shocks were
predicted by baseline household characteristics (in Table 10), and conducted falsiﬁcation tests (in
Table 11). Each of these tests conﬁrmed the exogeneity of the variables.
21the recall period (either 1999 or 2001) and the earthquake shock variable measures
the damage of events that occurred in January and February of 2001. Now, consider
the change in migrant stocks between the surveys with recall periods 2001 and 1999
(which were administered in 2002 and 2000). Both the agricultural and earthquake
shocks occurred between both migrant measurements. So, a regression of the change
in migrant stocks between 2002 and 2000 on the shocks from 2001 provides a test
of whether or not these events induced a change in the stock of migrants in the US
in 2002 relative to the stock in 2000. An ana l o g o u sa r g u m e n ta p p l i e st oc h a n g e si n
labor supply.
3.2 IPUMS
We also employ data on a sub-sample of Salvadoran migrants from the 5% micro-
sample of the 2000 United States Census (Ruggles et al. 2004). We deﬁne a Salvado-
r a nm i g r a n ta saU Sr e s i d e n tw h or e s i d e di nE lS a l v a d o rﬁve years prior to being
interviewed. There are 5,251 such individuals in the 2000 US Census. Because we
are interested in using these data to quantify wage diﬀerentials by gender, we further
r e s t r i c tt h es a m p l et ow o r k i n g - a g ep e o p l e ,w h o mw ed e ﬁne to be 20 years or older.
This further reduces the sample to 3,738. We employ variables on wages, age, years
in the United States, employment status, citizenship status, and education. Wages
22were constructed by dividing the respondent’s total wage income in the year by the
number of hours per week that the respondent reported to work multiplied by 52.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.
4 Empirical Results
We now turn to our empirical analysis. This section is organized as follows. In
the next sub-section, we investigate how labor is allocated within the household in
rural El Salvador. Next, we investigate how the household’s migration behavior
responds to risk. After that, we investigate how intra-household labor allocation
responds to risk. We conclude by investigating whether or not there are any impacts
of uninsured risk on labor supply outside of the household in El Salvador.
4.1 Intra-Household Labor Allocation
4.1.1 In the United States
We now investigate male-female diﬀerentials in wages and employment status among
Salvadoran migrants in the US.16 T a b l e4r e v e a l st w of a c t s .F i r s ti st h a tt h ea v e r a g e
16There is a large literature on gender diﬀerences in wages and employment in both developing and
developed countries. For an excellent overview of this literature, we refer the reader to Mammen
and Paxson (2000). Some of this literature has focused on determining whether these observed
23US wage of Salvadoran women, including women who are not in the labor force,
is $2.16 less than the wage of a Salvadoran male. Second, a far greater share of
Salvadoran women (46.39%) report being out of the labor force than Salvadoran
men (25.02%), suggesting that this wage gap is driven largely by diﬀerences in labor
force participation. 17 To give the reader a more comprehensive picture of these
wage gaps, we plot the cumulative density functions (CDF) of wages for men and
women in Figure 1. It can be seen that the male CDF dominates the female CDF
and that the largest discrepancies exist when wages are zero.
We can combine this with migration information from Table 1 to get a sense of
how many members in each household are both living abroad and in the labor force.
According to Table 1, the average number of female and male migrants per household
is 0.19 and 0.36, respectively. Using the labor force participation rates from the US
census, we calculate that a total of 0.19 * 0.5361 = 0.1019 females per household are
working migrants. The corresponding number for males is 0.36 * 0.7498 = 0.2699.
diﬀerentials are the consequence of productivity/skill diﬀerences across genders or discrimination.
Unfortunately, understanding the role that productivity diﬀerences play in determining wage and
employment disparities across genders has, to a large degree, been hampered by a dearth of data on
individual productivity. One notable exception is provided by Foster and Rosenzweig (1996). who
do have piece-rate data and conclude that women tend to be engaged in diﬀerent activities than
men because of diﬀerences in comparative advantage across genders and statistical discrimination.
That they ﬁnd an important role for productivity diﬀerences (albeit in a diﬀerent context) lends
credence to our model, which assumes that labor allocation diﬀerences between genders are due to
comparative advantage.
17These discrepancies most likely reﬂect diﬀerent migration motives among men, who generally
migrate for economic reasons, and women, who generally migrate to be reunited with their families.
See Donato (1994) for a discussion of these motives in the case of Mexican migration.
24These calculations suggest that there are roughly 2.6 times as many working male
migrants as female migrants per household.
In Table 5, we estimate wage regressions. The explanatory variables are gender,
age, experience in the US, education, and citizenship status. In the ﬁrst four columns,
we used OLS. In the ﬁfth and sixth columns, we estimated a Tobit model and the
censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) regression of Powell (1984).18 It can be
seen that even after we adjust for a number of potentially confounding variables, men
still earn more than two dollars per hour more than women in the OLS regressions.
In the last two columns, which display the results of censored regressions, the gap is
$4.65 (column 5) and $3.33 (column 6).19
We ﬁnd that international migration from El Salvador is predominately male.
The large male-female wage gap that we found suggests that this may be, in part,
driven by economic motives. Based on our theoretical framework, we would expect
that if a shock were to induce Northward migration that it should have larger eﬀects
18W ep r e f e rt h eO L Sr e s u l t sa n dt h eC L A Dr e s u l t st ot h eT o b i tr e s u l t s . O n er e a s o nw h yw e
like the OLS results is that we are interested in knowing the impact of gender on average wages
which includes both the extensive margin (i.e. labor force participation) and the intensive margin
(i.e. wage diﬀerentials among earners). The fact that the censoring is substantially higher for
women is indicative that the wages that Salvadoran women would have earned had they entered
the labor force was lower than their reservation wages. A simple OLS regression conveniently
summarizes this. In addition, Tobit models typically rely heavily on homoskedastic disturbances
and when this fails their performance can be weak. Both OLS and CLAD are robust to failures of
homoskedasticity. For additional opinions on this, we refer the reader to Deaton (1997).
19We bootstrapped the standard errors in column 6 when CLAD was employed using 100 repli-
cations.
25on men than on women since many households are at corner solutions with respect
to female migrants.20
4.1.2 In El Salvador
We now turn to how the distribution of hours worked in various household activities
diﬀers across genders in El Salvador.21 The activities that we consider are ﬁeld,
livestock, and domestic labor, which were discussed in Section 3.1.2. We calculate
CDF’s for the total number of hours devoted to each of these activities by an indi-
v i d u a ld u r i n gt h es u r v e yy e a rb yg e n d e r .F o rt h es a k eo fc l a r i t y ,i ti si m p o r t a n tt o
emphasize that, in contrast to the bulk of this paper where we work with household
aggregates, these ﬁgures display hours worked per year by an individual. The results
of this exercise are displayed in Figures 2, 3, and 4 for ﬁeld, livestock, and domestic
labor, respectively. These results indicate, perhaps not surprisingly, that ﬁeld labor
is largely (but not entirely) men’s work and that domestic labor is almost exclusively
women’s work. They also indicate that men are marginally more likely than women
to be engaged in livestock labor.
20While these results do suggest that economic considerations play an important role in the
household’s allocation problem, it is also important to mention that prevailing social mores in
Central America about the vulnerability of women may also mean that the costs of migration, as
perceived by the household, may be substantially higher for women (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes
2003).
21 In the Salvadoran data, we focus on hours worker as opposed to wages due to the fact that in
developing countries a large proportion of labor is not in the wage sector.
26Based on our theory, these ﬁgures have the following implications. First, given
that most households were at a corner solution in which no women were engaged in
either ﬁeld activities in El Salvador or wage labor in the US, we would expect the
agricultural shocks to have smaller eﬀects on female migration. Second, given that
Figure 4 suggests that the home is the woman’s domain, we would expect that the
earthquakes, which ostensibly increased the demand for home production, will be
dealt with increases in female hours allocated to domestic labor.
4.2 Migration and Risk
We now investigate how exogenous shocks in El Salvador aﬀect the gender compo-
sition of migrant ﬂows. Our benchmark regression equation is similar to that in
















 for  ∈ {} (3)
where ∆

 is the change in the stock of male or female migrants across time
periods, 

 is a year eﬀect,  is a vector of exogenous shocks such as the harvest
and livestock loss dummies and the earthquake damage index,  is a set of location
dummies and  is a set of demographic controls which were discussed in Table 3.
27Two sets of location dummies are employed: department dummies of which there are
14 and municipio d u m m i e so fw h i c ht h e r ea r e1 7 3 . 22 To address the obvious concern
that migration will have a contemporaneous impact on the household’s demographic
structure, we use lags of . We estimate the model using an ordered logit estimator
with the 2001 and 1999 waves of the BASIS panel. The advantage of the ordered logit
model is that it uses ancillary parameters that enable us to handle the dependent
variable in a ﬂexible manner. To account for the possibility of correlations across
observations within municipios, we cluster all standard errors by municipio.T a b l e
6 reports our results for male migration and Table 7 reports our results for female
migration.
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 displays estimation results when the dependent vari-
able is total migration (i.e. the sum of male and female migration) as a reference.
We see that the agricultural shocks had a positive and signiﬁcant impact on migra-
tion, whereas the earthquakes had a negative and signiﬁcant impact on migration.
The explanation that we give in Halliday (2006) for this result is that adverse agri-
cultural conditions in El Salvador expanded the North-South wage gap and thereby
increased the incentives for Northward migration, whereas the earthquakes increased
22In fact, there are 262 municipios in El Salvador, but only 173 of these are present in our data
due to the small sample sizes in the BASIS data. In addition, for some of the regressions in
this paper, some municipio dummies were dropped due to collinearity with the agricultural shock
dummies.
28the demand for labor at home which was met by a reduction in migration. In
that paper, we explored the possibility that the earthquakes stunted migration be-
cause they disrupted migration ﬁnancing, but the preponderance of evidence that we
uncovered did not support this alternative hypothesis.
In the second column of the table, we provide a simple identiﬁcation check. First,
we take the shocks from the 2001 (1999) wave of the panel and merge them into the
1999 (2001) wave. We call these "counterfactual" shocks. We then estimate the
speciﬁcation from the ﬁrst column using these counterfactual shocks while omitting
the actual shocks. The central idea of this exercise is that if households have time-
invariant characteristics that are systematically correlated with both migration and
the shocks then these counterfactual shocks should pick up false treatments.23 What
we see is that the -tests at the bottom of the column cannot reject the null that the
counterfactual shocks all have zero coeﬃcients which mitigates some of these omitted
variables concerns.
C o l u m n st h r e et h r o u g hs i xo fT a b l e6u s em a l em i g r a t i o na st h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i -
able. In all four columns, we see that adverse agricultural shocks had a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on migration. All tests of joint signiﬁcance had -values less than
23These omitted variable biases may arise if the shocks were non-randomly assigned to households
that either had weak ties to the United States or were poorer. In both scenarios, the shocks would
have been assigned to households that had unobserved characteristics that made them less likely
to migrate.
2910%. In addition, it is important to point out that in column six we use municipio
dummies and, while the agricultural shock dummies are no longer individually sig-
niﬁcant, they are still jointly signiﬁcant at the 10% level.24 We must emphasize that,
while the standard errors on the agricultural shocks are substantially higher, the
point-estimates are broadly in-line with the others in the table. This substantially
mitigates concerns of omitted variables bias.25 Interestingly and in stark contrast to
the ﬁrst column, we see that there is no relationship between the earthquakes and
male migration.
We emphasize (and reiterate) that a few points are important to bear in mind
when interpreting the results in Table 6. The ﬁrst is that, while all of the agricultural
shocks are not individually signiﬁcant, they are all jointly signiﬁcant. The second
is that, while the livestock loss dummy is never individually signiﬁcant, its point-
estimate is of a similar magnitude to the harvest loss dummy. The third is that
given the high degree of measurement error in our data and the fact that we have
between 600 and 700 households total, it is not reasonable to expect extremely high
24While this procedure does mitigate omitted variables concerns, it also eliminates a substantial
amount of variation in the shocks - much of which is meaningful variation. As such it is unreasonable
to expect high -statistics on the agricultural shocks as this is a highly ineﬃcient procedure. Because
of this, the fact that we have such a low -value on our -tests is a strong testament to our claim
that our agricultural shocks are probably not picking up omitted variables.
25For example, the areas in El Salvador with long histories of migration to the US are in the rural
northern and eastern parts of the country which were hit hardest by the civil war. It might be
reasonable to expect that these areas also have a higher prevalence of risky agricultural activities
which could create a spurious relationship between the agricultural shocks and migration. For a
more comprehensive discussion of some of these omitted variables concerns, see Halliday (2006).
30levels of signiﬁcance in the table.26 Finally, while the use of the municipio dummies
does increase the standard errors, it does not aﬀect the point-estimates.
This is consistent with the critique in Deaton (1995) in which he says that, while
the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects in regressions does mitigate concerns of omitted variables,
it comes with the added cost of lower eﬃciency, particularly, in the presence of
measurement error. These costs are even higher when the independent variables are
serially correlated over time. This ﬁnal point, we believe, suggests that the inclusion
of department dummies, rather than municipio dummies, is a good compromise
between addressing omitted variables while not paying too high of a cost in eﬃciency
loss.
Turning to the results for female migration in Table 7, we see a substantially
diﬀerent picture. Now the relationship between the agricultural shocks and migration
is more muted than in the previous table as can seen by the lower point estimates
and -tests at the bottom of the table. In addition, we now see a large, negative,
and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the earthquakes and migration. In
fact, the point estimates for women are substantially larger than the estimate in the
ﬁrst column of the previous table, where the dependent variable was total migration.
Finally, the earthquake eﬀects are greatest when we include the municipio dummies,
26The 1265 households reported at the bottom of the table double counts households.
31which once again mitigates many omitted variables concerns.
These results are broadly consistent with the observed allocations of labor within
Salvadoran households. We observed that both labor in the North and on the farm
in the South are male dominated. Consistent with theory, we observed that the
agricultural shocks impacted male migration and had no eﬀects on female migra-
tion. In addition, if one believes that the earthquakes increased the demand for
domestic services in the South then the large negative impacts of the earthquakes on
female migration are consistent with the observation that domestic labor is female
dominated.
4.3 Intra-Household Labor Allocation and Risk
We now turn to how stochastic shocks aﬀect the allocation of labor within the house-
hold in El Salvador. We deﬁne 

 to be the number of labor hours devoted to
sector  by all members of household  of gender  in year  where the sectors are
ﬁeld, livestock and domestic activity. We then estimate a similar model to equation
( 3 )e x c e p tt h a tw eu s e∆

 as the dependent variable using OLS. Each regression
includes a set of department dummies and (lagged) demographic controls. Our core
results are reported in Table 8.
First, consider the coeﬃcient estimates on the earthquake damage index. In
32the last column of the table, we see that households that were hit hard by the
earthquakes also experienced a dramatic increase in the number of hours devoted
to domestic labor by women. The proper interpretation of the point estimate is
that a 1% increase in earthquake damage is associated with an increase of 1.54 hours
devoted to domestic labor by women. This implies that a household that was hit
three times harder by the earthquakes than another experienced a 462 hour increase
in hours devoted to domestic work by women during the year, on average! In
contrast, in column ﬁve, we see that the earthquakes had no eﬀect on male hours
devoted to domestic activities. Finally, we note that the estimate on earthquake
damage in column four, where the dependent variable is the change in livestock
hours worked by women, is negative and moderately signiﬁcant suggesting that the
earthquakes may have induced a substitution away from livestock production toward
home production.
Next, consider the eﬀects of the two agricultural shocks on hours. We see that
harvest losses had large, positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁeld hours for men. We
also see that livestock losses had similar eﬀects on livestock hours for both men and
women. However, livestock losses had no eﬀects on ﬁeld hours, nor did harvest losses
have any eﬀects on livestock hours for either men or women.
T o w a r d st h eb o t t o mo ft h et a b l e ,w er e p o r tt h er e s u l t so ff a l s i ﬁcation tests that
33a r es i m i l a rt ot h o s ei nc o l u m n2o fT a b l e6 . W eo b s e r v et h a tt h e-values on the
-tests are all quite high and always greater than 10%. This mitigates concerns
that the shock variables are picking up omitted variables.
There is an interesting concordance between these results and the analysis of hours
worked by gender discussed above. We established that, compared to women, men
are more likely to work in the ﬁelds, equally as likely to work with livestock, and less
l i k e l yt od od o m e s t i cw o r k .T h ee ﬀects of the shocks on labor in the ﬁeld, livestock,
and domestic sectors follow a similar pattern in the sense that the harvest shocks
had larger eﬀects on men than women, the livestock shocks had similar eﬀects, and
the earthquakes had smaller eﬀects. This empirical result is very much consistent
with the discussion of comparative advantage in the theoretical section of the paper.
In addition, the results in the table suggest that a subsistence constraint may
be binding. Indeed, we would expect that the harvest and livestock shocks which
presumably lowered marginal productivity in agricultural activities in El Salvador
would tend to have induced a substitution away from (not towards) agricultural
activities.27 Moreover, we also found that these same shocks induced Northward
migration.
27A similar result was found by Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003), who show that there
was a tendency for the labor supply to increase in the aftermath of the Indonesian ﬁnancial crisis
in the late 1990s despite the fact that it caused a 40% reduction in real wages in the formal sector.
34Do these ﬁndings pose a paradox? Our theory suggests not. Essentially, the
household increases farm hours to keep their heads above water, while at the same
time sending members abroad. The migration eﬀects serve two purposes. One is
also to help the family subsist. The second is a standard substitution eﬀect in which
the returns to labor on the farm are low and so the family substitutes towards better
remunerated activities.
We conclude this sub-section with two robustness checks. In the ﬁrst, we estimate
models similar to those in Table 8 except that now we employ the number of hours
devoted to a particular labor activity per adult male or female (i.e. total hours
worked by the household divided by the number of adult men or women) as the
dependent variable.28 These results are reported in Table 9. Overall, our conclusions
are unaﬀected, although we do see that the coeﬃcient on livestock loss is diminished
in column 3. In the second robustness check, we re-estimate the regressions in Table
8, but with municipio dummies in lieu of department dummies. These results are
reported in Table 10. Once again, our conclusions are unaﬀected and, if anything,
are stronger.
28We deﬁne an adult to be anyone 16 years of age or older.
354.4 Outside Labor Supply and Risk
We conclude this section by estimating the impact of uninsured risk on the house-
hold’s labor supplied outside of the household in El Salvador. To do this, we estimate
a model similar to equation (3) except that now the dependent variable is the change
in the number of household members (of a given gender) who reported working in a
given sector across successive survey years. As with the migration variable, here we
also use an ordered logit model. The results are reported in Table 11 for men and
Table 12 for women. Overall, we do not see any eﬀects of exogenous shocks on labor
supplied outside of the household. The entire impact of uninsured risk appears to
be absorbed within the household and by the US labor market.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Using panel data from El Salvador, we investigated how the intra-household alloca-
tion of labor responds to stochastic shocks within the context of a model of a farm
household in that country. We showed that adverse shocks in the agricultural sec-
tor were met by increases in the number of male migrants living in the US and by
increases in male hours devoted to agricultural activities on the household’s farm.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the presence of a binding subsistence constraint. In
36contrast, damage sustained by households due to the 2001 earthquakes had a large
negative eﬀect on female migration, but had absolutely no eﬀe c to nm a l em i g r a t i o n .
We also showed that the earthquakes were met by a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of hours that women devoted to domestic labor, but had no impact on male
domestic hours. This is consistent with the ﬁnding in our data that over 90% of all
households do not allocate any males to domestic activities. Thus it appears that
it was the women who picked up the pieces left by the disaster. Overall, our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that household responses to adverse shocks are consistent with a simple
framework in which household members are allocated to diﬀerent sectors according
to their comparative advantage. Finally, we showed that the local labor market
in El Salvador does not help households to mitigate the eﬀects of adverse shocks.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with a model in which rural Salvadoran households are
behaving rationally, but at a subsistence level.
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4142Table 1: Summary Statistics from BASIS: Migration, Hours Worked in Household














Field Hours1 Total number of hours in the year that household
members devoted to ﬁeld labor
106533
(158432)






Livestock Hours1 Total number of hours in the year that household
members devoted to caring for livestock
47417
(92888)






Domestic Hours1 Total number of hours in the year that household
members devoted to domestic labor
453391
(343947)














Quakedamage3 Cost of all household damage due to the 2001
earthquakes (in 1992 $, in logs)
464
(380)
1Data are from 1997, 1999 and 2001. Sample size is 2008.
2Data are from 1999 and 2001. Sample size is 1365.
3Data are from 2001. Sample size is 689.





Number of family members that worked
outside of the household in any sector
162
(146)






Outside - Agriculture1 Number of family members that worked outside
of the household in the agricultural sector
093
(133)






Outside - Industry1 Number of family members that worked outside
of the household in the industrial sector
027
(057)







Number of family members that worked outside
of the household in the commercial sector
014
(048)







Number of family members that worked outside
of the household in the service sector
036
(066)







Number of family members that worked outside
of the household in the textile sector
007
(031)






+All data are from 1997, 1999 and 2001. Sample size is 2008.
44Table 3: Summary Statistics from BASIS: Demographic Variables


























∗Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Data are from the 1997, 1999 and 2001 waves of
the survey.


















- Employed 69.39% 45.66%
- Unemployed 5.58% 7.95%
- Not in labor force 25.02% 46.39%
Citizenship Status
- Born abroad of American Citizens 0.20% 0.44%
- Naturalized Citizen 4.98% 5.00%
- Not a citizen 94.82% 94.56%
Education
- None 13.76% 14.46%
- 1 to 4 Years 8.04% 7.95%
- 5 to 8 Years 25.70% 24.04%
- 9 Years 11.36% 9.58%
- 10 Years 2.89% 2.83%
- 11 Years 3.08% 3.19%
- 12 Years 22.95% 22.47%
- 1 to 3 Years of College 7.75% 10.06%
- 4 or more Years of College 4.48% 5.42%
∗The data in this table come from a sub-sample of Salvadorans in the
US who were residing in El Salvador in 1995 who were at least 20 years
old. Standard deviation in parentheses. Wages are in 1999$.
46T a b l e5 :U SW a g eR e g r e s s i o n s





























































Ed. Dum? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Citizen. Dum? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit CLAD
2 0.0327 0.0469 0.0548 0.0571 0.0216 0.0637
 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738
∗These regressions use the same data as Table 3. -ratios are in parentheses.
47Table 6: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks: Male Migration





















































Demographic Variables1 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Municipio Dummies No No No No No Yes
Department Dummies No No No No Yes No
Decomposition? All All Male Male Male Male

























Pseudo 2 0.0078 0.0039 0.0070 0.0080 0.0237 0.0601
Households 1265 1244 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where the dependent
variable is male migration. All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
-statistics reported in parentheses.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the number of household
members at home within certain age and gender brackets reported in Table 2.
2-values are reported below each -statistic.
3In this column, the dependent variable is the sum of male and female migration.
4In this column, we employed the "counterfactual" shocks described in Section 4.
48Table 7: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks: Female Migration





































Demographic Variables1 No Yes Yes Yes
Municipio Dummies No No No Yes
Department Dummies No No Yes No

















Pseudo 2 0.0082 0.0130 0.0170 0.0769
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where the dependent
variable is female migration. All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
-statistics reported in parentheses.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the number of household
members at home within certain age and gender brackets. Details are in Section 2.3.
2-values are reported below each -statistic.
49Table 8: Adverse Shocks and Hours Worked
∆ Field Hours ∆ Livestock Hours ∆ Domestic Hours
Men Women Men Women Men Women





















































2 0.0384 0.0207 0.0381 0.0405 0.0203 0.0644
























Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the change in hours worked in a
particular sector broken down by gender. All regressions contain lagged demographic controls and
department dummies. All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
-statistics reported in parentheses.
1Reports the -test that the counter-factual shock coeﬃcient estimates were zero. These
results were obtained from separate regressions (N=1244) in which the speciﬁcations were
identical to those in this table except that the actual shocks were replaced with the
counter-factual shocks. -value is in brackets.
50Table 9: Robustness Check: Adverse Shocks and Hours Worked - per Capita
∆ Field Hours ∆ Livestock Hours ∆ Domestic Hours
Men Women Men Women Men Women





















































2 0.0247 0.0129 0.0403 0.0370 0.0292 0.0429
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the change in hours worked per
adult male or female in a particular sector broken down by gender. All regressions contain lagged
demographic controls and department dummies. All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
-statistics reported in parentheses.
51Table 10: Robustness Check: Adverse Shocks and Hours Worked - Municipio FE
∆ Field Hours ∆ Livestock Hours ∆ Domestic Hours
Men Women Men Women Men Women





















































2 0.1029 0.1091 0.1398 0.0925 0.0348 0.1344
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the change in hours worked in a
sector broken down by gender. All regressions contain lagged demographic controls and
municipio dummies. All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
-statistics reported in parentheses.
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Pseudo 2 0.0135 0.0169 0.0140 0.0095 0.0745
Sector Ag Ind Com Serv Tex
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains ordered logit estimates where the dependent variable is the change in the
number of HH members who worled outside the HH by sector. All regressions contain
lagged demographic controls and department dummies. All standard errors allow for
clustering within municipios. -statistics reported in parentheses.
53Table 12: Adverse Shocks and Hours Worked Outside the HH - Women













































2 0.0075 0.0746 0.0264 0.0158 0.0426
Sector Ag Ind Com Serv Tex
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains ordered logit estimates where the dependent variable is the change in the
number of HH members who worled outside the HH by sector. All regressions contain
lagged demographic controls and department dummies. All standard errors allow for
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